Gödel's theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that given any machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing as being true — i.e., the formula is unprovable-in-the-system-but which we can see to be true. It follows that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind...
...I regard the Gödel argument as showing that conscious understanding is something that cannot be properly imitated by a computer. ...if consciousness is part of physics—-describable by the “true” laws of physics—-then the true laws of physics must be non-computable. It is known (using Gödel-Turing-type arguments) that there are many areas of mathematics which are actually non-computable, so I am claiming that the true laws of physics (not yet fully known to us) must also be non-computable.